The Cold War ended in 1991. The United States’ commitment to prevent its adversaries’ nuclear ambitions and to extend its nuclear arsenal as an umbrella of protection to its partners has remained ...

The Cold War ended in 1991. The United States’ commitment to prevent its adversaries’ nuclear ambitions and to extend its nuclear arsenal as an umbrella of protection to its partners has remained ...

Hours prior to his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, U.S. President Donald Trump posted on social media, “Because of other countries testing programs, I have instructed the Department of War ...

The Cold War ended in 1991. The United States’ commitment to prevent its adversaries’ nuclear ambitions and to extend its nuclear arsenal as an umbrella of protection to its partners has remained ...

Editor’s note: This article belongs to a two-part series about addressing the nuclear arms control trilemma. Read the second article in the series. Readers of the Bulletin might be surprised that I’m ...

Whether the United States defines China as a global threat or a predominantly regional one will have pervasive implications for U.S. alliance and deterrence strategy in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

The United States needs a nuclear posture that can credibly deter limited, non-strategic nuclear war without either forcing it to escalate to central, strategic war or forcing it to lose an ongoing ...

Nuclear defense in a tripolar world would be complex and expensive. For this reason, the United States, Russia, and China could still have a shared interest in arms control agreements. The New START ...

Robert Peters is a Senior Research Fellow for Strategic Deterrence in Heritage’s Allison Center for National Security. The United States and South Korea face increasingly dangerous threats in China ...

The puzzle of nuclear deterrence is now further muddied by the emergence of cyber threats and their nebulous role in conflict escalation. As doctrine continues to be shaped, there is the ongoing risk ...